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Information Perception and Climate Change Adaptation
Abstract
Despite 97% of scientists believing that climate change is occurring, a far smaller proportion of ordinary
citizens agree with this statement and the proportion of those who do greatly diverge by political
affiliation. This paper lays out a dynamic information updating model with adaptation choice as the final
outcome, linking information perception, belief perception, and behavioral implementation. Furthermore,
this paper examines how various behavioral and environmental factors affect the agent’s adaptation
choices by means of such cognitive processes. This research has implications for further research on
climate change preference formation and effective communication strategies, such as informative or
normative nudges.
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Information Perception and Climate Change Adaptation
1. Introduction
In this paper, I construct a model of individual adaptation to climate
change in both the presence and absence of perceived climate change and
examine agents’ cognitive processes of information selection and perception.
I begin by constructing a standard utility maximization model for
adaptation. Expected environmental damages are represented as a function of
damages dependent on an agent’s believed state of the world. Assuming an
agent’s beliefs about the state of the world directly affect her adaptation
decisions, I then explore how the agent arrives at such beliefs to begin with in
the presence and absence of objective information using a dynamic information
updating model. Whether a certain information signal is perceived as objective
is determined by the individual agent.
An agent who processes information purely on its scientific validity
alone will engage in Bayesian updating and realize the true state of climate
change regardless of her priors. However, under the assumption that the agent
attaches a measure of “opinionated-ness” to all information signals, a separate
model is needed to describe how the agent assigns weights. This model takes
into account how the agent’s priors affect the cognitive process of assigning
weights to each information signal the agent encounters. Through this model, I
demonstrate that reinforcement of the agent’s priors, especially that of false
beliefs, is the most likely outcome due to behavioral and environmental factors.
Though not officially modeled, I also analyze how information selection
interacts with such processes, ultimately resulting in under-adaptation.
Most of the previous literature that have analyzed the relationship
between climate change perception and adaptation decisions have done so
through examining the role of risk perception. By modeling an agent’s cognitive
processes of belief updating, this paper aims to contribute to the existing
literature by shifting the focus to how real-life behavioral or environmental
factors may affect both the agent’s belief updating processes and adaptation
decisions.
2. Context and Motivation
2.1 Political Ideology and Beliefs on Climate Change
There is a well-established consensus among adult Americans
regarding climate change and the degree of human contribution. According to a
survey conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication
(Howe et al., 2020), approximately 72% of Americans believed that global
warming is happening, and 57% believed that human activity was the main
driving force behind global warming.
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Though these numbers themselves do not seem problematic at face
value, further analysis presents two major concerns. First, the numbers stated
above fall far behind the consensus within the scientific community in which
97% of scientists believe that global warming is underway and caused by human
activity (Gustafson and Goldberg, 2018). There are several reasons that can
explain this discrepancy between the scientific community and the general
population: people’s opinions about climate change being affected by factors
other than direct science, misinformation campaigns, and the lack of publication
of a scientific consensus.
What is interesting is that all three factors have to do with how
information is disseminated, perceived, and processed by individual agents.
Accounting for other factors besides scientific evidence has to do with how
much people weigh scientific facts against other types of information or beliefs;
misinformation campaigns directly affect people’s perceptions of reality; wider
information dissemination would allow more people to become aware of the
scientific consensus and evidence in support of global warming.
The second concern in addition to the relatively low awareness among
the general public compared with the scientific community is that these trends
diverge even further when broken down by political affiliation. Whereas 95%
of liberal Democrats and 89% of moderate/conservative Democrats agree that
global warming is happening, only 44% of conservative Republicans do so
(Leiserowitz et al., 2019). Such discrepancies exist in more complex
assessments as well, such as whether one agrees whether different entities
should do more to address global warming or whether global warming should
be a “high” priority for the president and Congress.
Though the fact that political affiliation affects an individual’s stance
towards climate change is nothing new, the larger concern is that, despite
climate change and global warming being a scientific phenomenon, such trends
hold true even when taking the level of acquired scientific knowledge into
account. According to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center (2019), the
proportion of adult Democrats in the United States who believed that human
activity greatly contributed to climate change was positively correlated with the
acquisition of scientific knowledge. However, such a pattern was not found
among Republicans.
One good news is that these initial opinions towards climate change are
not permanently fixed and can be reversed to some degree. Another survey by
the Yale Program of Climate Change Communication (Deeg et al., 2019) asked
whether people had shifted their beliefs on global warming and examined
whether those who did shared any specific characteristics. Approximately 8%
of Americans had shifted their beliefs in the past year, and 84% of those who
did became more concerned about global warming, demonstrating that it was
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possible for people to shift their beliefs in both directions. Out of those who
became more concerned, 20% attributed their increased concern to becoming
more informed about the subject matter and 18% to hearing about the impacts
of global warming. This suggested that increased exposure to the relevant
information could nudge, if not entirely persuade, people in forming “accurate”
beliefs, which underscored the role of effective communication strategies.
The absence of a converging worldview towards climate change is
concerning because an accurate perception of the status quo serves as a gateway
belief for other derivative beliefs that potentially translate into public support or
political capital for politicians to shape relevant public policies. Throughout this
paper, I define the true state of the world as one in which climate change is
severe, and “objective,” “correct,” or “accurate” information as one that relays
or supports this worldview.
2.2 Belief Polarization
Based on the assumption that humans are rational (i.e. care about their
self-interests), it would not be difficult to also assume that despite an
individual’s current beliefs about climate change, she would be willing to
change her mind in the right direction once exposed to new information that
points. However, studies have shown that the exact opposite occurs in
controversial topics such as climate change. Despite it being their best interests
to update her beliefs in the direction suggested by the evidence, more commonly
known as Bayesian updating, people with a strong set of priors (i.e. prior beliefs)
come out of the updating process by holding on to their beliefs more strongly
than before.
This phenomenon is more commonly known as belief polarization, also
defined as a situation in which a group of people receive the same information
but update their beliefs in diverging directions. This can also be observed among
other contentious social issues, such as the death penalty or the use of nuclear
weapons. Studies showed that both supporters and opponents of any social issue
emerged as more adamant in their previous beliefs after encountering mixed
information that incorporated both sides’ arguments (Lord, Ross, and Lepper,
1979). This phenomenon also presented itself in encounters with purely factual
reports, which has to do with the fact that despite information being “objective,”
the individual perceiving such information is not.
According to Bayesian updating, a rational agent would update her
prior beliefs on the basis of new evidence to form a revised posterior set of
beliefs, and such beliefs would only be updated in the direction suggested by
the evidence (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016). However, those who exhibit belief
polarization will not take into account the unambiguous scientific evidence
regarding climate change. To those agents, information signals are not taken in
as objective facts, but instead attached with a measure of “opinionated-ness”

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2020

3

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 17 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 10

that is used to gauge how consistent each information signal is with their current
worldview and used to solidify their priors. I will later show that this irrational
process not only creates a gap between an agent’s input and output, but also in
her believed state of the world and reality.
To reduce the gap between their believed and actual state of the world,
agents must be provided with factually accurate and reasonably complete
information. Based on this information, they should update their beliefs in an
unbiased way that focuses on the factual content of the information provided
rather than the degree to which it fits their social or political agenda. The reason
that I emphasize “reasonably complete” as opposed to full information before
an agent makes any changes to her beliefs is that full information may not
always be valuable considering the costs of collecting information. Therefore,
while a certain amount of information is necessary in making any optimizing
decision, most people make decisions with less than complete information.
While the processing of information signals is dependent on the agent’s
motivation and ability to comprehend information, this does not take away from
the importance that scientific or political institutions hold in information
dissemination. The chances of the agent picking up information signals needed
to update their beliefs in the right direction (i.e. conducting Bayesian updating)
can be increased by the wider dissemination of proper information and
eradication of misinformation campaigns.
2.3 Adaptation
In the previous subsection, I stated that the way in which new
information is inherently perceived by the agent (i.e. whether information is
perceived as factual evidence or as a measure of “opinionated-ness”) affects the
agent’s assessment of the state of the world and described how the processing
of information may result in belief polarization when the agent’s priors are taken
into account. In this section, I explain how the agent’s beliefs that arise out of
such a belief updating process affect her adaptation responses, one of the two
widely used strategies to manage climate change. This is consistent with my
hypothesis stated in the introduction that the way in which an agent processes
the information signals she encounters will initially affect belief formation,
which will in turn affect the agent’s practical adaptation decisions (i.e. an agent
requires forming a belief about the state of the world before making any
adaptation decisions).
Adaptation is defined as the process of adjustment to actual or expected
climate change and its effects. In the context of global warming and climate
change, it inherently carries self-protective characteristics (IPCC, 2018).
Though adaptation can be carried out by entities with varying scopes of
influence, I focus on individual responses throughout this paper.
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Along with mitigation, adaptation is considered as one of the two key
strategies to combat climate change. The two strategies are not only
complementary in that both are required to successfully reduce and manage the
risks of climate change, but also interactive in that calculating potential damages,
which affects predicting the efficacy of mitigation efforts, is a direct function of
individual adaptation and behavior. A more precise prediction of damages
would provide a closer range of estimates for climate change-related losses, and
therefore lay out a more accurate timeline for mitigation that reflects the most
up-to-date reality. Moreover, mitigation levels affect the magnitude of climate
change, and greater rates of climate change will increase the likelihood of
exceeding adaptation limits and the types of adaptation strategies available for
the average individual agent (IPCC, 2014).
While mitigation focuses on reducing emissions, which makes it an
effective strategy only when conducted on a global scale, adaptation has been
proven to effectively decrease monetary damages even at the individual or local
level by using capabilities that are available to a particular community (Adger,
2001). In fact, it is precisely because of its flexibility and capacity to be carried
out at the individual level, along with the realization that a certain amount of
climate change is inevitable, that adaptation has recently been considered an
effective response tool against climate change — since climate change is very
much underway, adaptation could help lessen the degree to which individuals
and local populations remain vulnerable to some of the inevitable damages.
Adaptation is also unique in that unlike other large-scale entities, which
require a collective decision-making process, an individual agent is solely
responsible for her adaptation decisions. This also implies that under-resourced
individuals may be left vulnerable when proper information dissemination does
not occur. Hausman and Stolper (2020) explored how information failures,
which typically led the individual agent to systemically underestimate her
exposure to pollution, affected housing choice as a function of a household’s
distance from a pollution source. They found that when more information
became available, individuals’ willingness to pay for environmental goods such
as air quality increased, demonstrating a positive correlation between exposure
to relevant information and people’s willingness and capacity to use it.
Believing that information possesses the ability to directly shape an
agent’s perception of the state of the world, previous research has attempted to
demonstrate the link between perception, intention, and behavior. Fishbein and
Ajzen (2010) created the Reasoned Action Approach (RAA) in which agents’
attitudes towards a certain behavior, their perceived norms, and perceived
behavioral control were believed to determine their intentions, which in turn
affected behavior. Findings consistent with this theory were demonstrated by
Mase et al. (2017) in which they discovered that the beliefs that farmers in the
Midwest region of the United States had towards climate change significantly
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predicted adaptation behaviors. Furthermore, to the extent that adaptation
strategies were influenced by beliefs, attitudes, and perceived climate risks, the
rate and scope of their implementation were able to be influenced by
information campaigns, education, and training, with social norms acting as
behavioral nudges.
More generally, the willingness to use risk-assessing information was
found to be correlated with direct exposure, emphasizing the need for targeted,
localized information campaigns. Higginbotham et al. (2013) and Bickerstaff et
al. (2004) found that direct exposure to climate change impacts led to increased
threat appraisal, and that only then were weather or climate information
incorporated into adaptive or mitigative behaviors. This was consistent with the
findings of O’Connor et al. (2005) in which water managers who had directly
experienced adverse weather events were not only more likely to expect such
events in the future, but also that their willingness to use weather and climate
forecasts in their adaptation decisions was closely tied to their feeling at risk,
regardless of its specific source.
2.4 Misestimation of Environmental Damages
In the previous subsection, I explored how the fact that information
perception affects belief formation, which in turn affects adaptation choice
makes it imperative for the information being disseminated to be factually
accurate to begin with. In this section, I analyze how a misstep in either of the
prior two steps (i.e. either information perception or belief formation) may result
in an agent’s misestimation of climate change-induced damages.
In principle, a misperception of the status quo could cause the agent to
either underestimate or overestimate her environmental damages, preventing
the most efficient use of resources. Failure to develop an adequate adaptation
strategy would result in either underpreparing and facing more damages than
previously thought or overpreparing and consuming more time and resources
than was necessary. Between the two, I assume that underestimation is more
common than overestimation.
One reason I assume underestimation is more common is that
governments typically institute regulations and preventative measures after new
information comes into light. Only then do individuals and businesses refrain
from conducting business as usual in compliance with such regulations. This
holds true for pre-existing EPA regulations, which have generally become more
stringent in light of new information, especially that pertaining to new pathways
for damages. For example, the Clean Air Act (2017) was expanded from its
original set of guidelines such that sources of air pollution that were initially
regulated at the state-level became monitored by the federal government. This
quickly established regulatory programs with more specific air quality
requirements, federal enforcements, and federally issued permits. The
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amendments also added several new pollutants such as acid rain, CFCs, and
halon to the list of chemicals that needed to be monitored.
Assuming that the public primarily refers to EPA regulations to obtain
information about general environmental quality and its valuation (Hausman &
Stolpher, 2020), it is evident that the average individual faces considerable
obstacles if she wishes to predict the precise amount of environmental damages
that she will face. Several factors may prevent the average individual agent from
accurately assessing the progression of climate change.
One of the reasons that the individual agent may not be able to accurately
assess the progression of climate change is that national and local media outlets
may send conflicting signals regarding the state of climate change. In this case,
the agent may be prevented from forming a coherent set of beliefs about the
state of the world or make the wrong assessment when she chooses a news
source that seems more applicable to her (e.g. a national news source says
climate change is severe, while a local news source may omit or relay the
opposite information).
Somewhat related to the different kinds of messages sent by different
kinds of media is the fact that some media systemically bias their news reports
for the sake of promoting “fairness.” J. Boykoff and M. Boykoff (2004)
analyzed news reports from 1988 to 2002 and discovered that widely accepted
journalistic practices and norms to promote “balance” not only diverged popular
discourse from scientific accuracy, but also contributed to the biased coverage
of anthropogenic contributions to global warming. Though not the focus of this
paper, it was also found that some news outlets, in the interest of serving fossil
fuel companies or other organizations, have been serving up climate change
denialism. This demonstrates how news outlets, which constitute one of the
principal sources of how ordinary citizens come to acquire information, may
have various different motivations for reporting conflicting, sometimes outright
false, information.
Another reason the individual agent may not be able to accurately
assess the state of the world is optimism bias. Climate change is a particularly
vulnerable field because such cognitive biases are more likely to occur when
uncertainty levels are high. Howe et al. (2017) conducted a national survey and
found that 57% of Americans believed that climate change would harm
Americans in general, whereas only 42% believed that climate change would
affect them personally.
This phenomenon is more commonly known as optimism bias or
unrealistic optimism. When it comes to assessing personal risk, individuals
evaluate their own situations differently from those of the general population,
perceiving their personal risk of being harmed by a certain threat to be smaller
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than the average probability. Through FMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging), Sharot et al. (2011) discovered that such optimism was partially
derived from a failure to learn systemically from “new, undesirable information.”
After asking participants to estimate a range of negative events both before and
after being exposed to their true average probability, they observed that only
when the estimates were more pessimistic did participants update their estimates
accordingly.
Lastly, individuals may simply not have access to the most recent or
accurate information that primarily circulates within academic or scientific
communities. Even if they do have access, they may lack the capacity to fully
comprehend academic reports and translate them into practical decisions. For
each information source, I hypothesize that there is a measure of accuracy (i.e.
how close it is to portraying the accurate state of the world) and potential bias
(i.e. how systematically wrong it is) such that when agents misestimate such
parameters, they would systemically misinterpret the information given and
make decisions that are skewed in one direction. The average agent is likely to
not be fully aware what the parameters are for each source, since the “true” state
of the world is rarely revealed. Without such information, agents are left with
no objective or reliable metric to base their decisions on.
A lack of access to information may have larger socioeconomic
implications than previously thought as mentioned by Hausman and Stolpher
(2020). Individuals tend to underestimate pollution by having only a partial
understanding of the extent of hazards they are exposed to. Therefore, individual
optimization decisions regarding consumption and adaptation will only factor
in the effects of climate change indicators or pollutants they are aware of. This
implies that the average individual agent will primarily refer to visible indicators
of climate change and exclude less visible sources from her calculations. This
also implies that she would also have to take time and resources to obtain
information that would get at the “true” state of the world, since pathways of
climate change are more diverse and complex than what an average individual
can ordinarily think of.
3. Theory
Given the effect of psychological and behavioral heuristics on
information perception and behavior, I will construct a model of individual
adaptation to climate change in both the presence and absence of perceived
climate change. I model an information perception model in which one’s priors
and cognitive mechanisms for weighing information affect information
perception, which in turn affect adaptation decisions. In section 3.1, I will lay
out a basic behavioral model in which an agent optimizes the amount of
adaptation. In section 3.2, I will lay out the damage function and its properties.
In section 3.3, I will combine the elements of 3.1 and 3.2 to distinguish people
into two categories based on their information perception habits. In sections 3.4
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and 3.5, I will expand on such cognitive processes and demonstrate how those
who believe information is inherently biased or opinionated will likely result in
under-adaptation.
3.1 Basic Behavioral Model
I begin with a simplified model of utility maximization. The model is
a standard utility model in that it depicts an agent optimizing over the choice
of the amount of adaptation and a numeraire representing all other goods,
given a budget constraint. For all of the models, it is important to note that all
of the subsequent optimization problems represent the ex-ante believed utility
she is making choices on, which is different from the ex-post utility she will
actually receive when the level of damage hits. Based on our assumptions
regarding cognitive heuristics and human behavior, I derive a simple
consumer optimization model in which the agent receives utility from two
goods:
max 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑦) − 𝑑(𝑎|𝑠) s.t. 𝑃𝑎 ∙ 𝑎 + 𝑦 ≤ 𝑚
(1)
𝑎,𝑦

where the first term of the utility function denotes general
consumption. This is increasing and concave with a diminishing marginal
utility to provide a trade-off between general consumption and damages.
•
•
•

d represents climate change damages, which is in turn a variable of
climate change adaptation ( 𝑎) . oote that the damage does not
represent actual damages, but believed damages.
y represents general consumption, defined as dollars worth of
consumption. For convenience, we assume 𝑃𝑦 = 1.
𝑠 ∈ {0,1} is a binary variable that denotes the agent’s believed state
of the world. 𝑠 = 0 represents a low level of climate change and 𝑠 =
1 represents the opposite. We also define adaptation as a binary
choice variable such that she can choose to undergo either a low or
high level or adaptation.

The second term translates environmental damages as a direct
function of adaptation dependent on one’s believed state of the world,
represented as 𝑠. Because her utility would decrease as damages increase,
unlike general consumption, this function is decreasing and concave with
diminishing marginal utility. It is important to note that, even though the agent
infers rather than observes 𝑠 and 𝑑, the true value of 𝑑 is what ultimately
impacts her utility.
3.2 The Damage Function
The next component of the model is environmental damages. To ease
calculations in the model, I simplify the damage function by taking a linear
approximation. The damage function will be a function of the amount of
adaptation chosen and have the state of the world as parameters:

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2020

9

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 17 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 10

𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑠
(2)
𝑠 ∈ {0,1} is a binary variable that denotes the agent’s believed state of the world.
𝑠 = 0 represents a low level of climate change and 𝑠 = 1 represents the
opposite. I also define adaptation as a binary choice variable such that she can
choose to undergo either a low or high level or adaptation. Given this
information, 𝛽0 represents the actual level of damages an agent will receive
when she believes that climate change is severe but does not choose to adapt,
since 𝑑 = 𝛽0 when 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑠 = 1.
This is consistent with the basic intuition that a higher level of perceived
climate change would result in a higher level of perceived damages. When 𝑠 =
0, damages become 0. When 𝑠 = 1, then 𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎). Damages would be
positive only when 𝛽0 − 𝑎 > 0, or 𝛽0 > 𝑎. However, 𝑎 is a choice variable,
so either the range of 𝑎 is restricted to be from 0 to 𝛽0, or the price of 𝑎 is
high enough such that a consumer would never choose to buy negative damages.
Based on these assumptions, the damage function will entail the following
characteristics:
1) 𝑑(𝑎 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤|𝑠 = 1) > 𝑑(𝑎 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ|𝑠 = 1)
which means that given that there is a significant degree of climate change, a
higher level of adaptation will decrease damages than a lower level of
adaptation.
2) 𝑑(𝑎 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤|𝑠 = 0) = 𝑑(𝑎 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ|𝑠 = 0)
which means that given that there is not a significant degree of climate change,
the damages would not be dependent on the level of adaptation. That is, the level
of damages would be equal for both low and high levels of adaptation given that
we predict a low level of climate change.
With this damage function, I expand from the optimization problem stated
in section 3.1 and incorporate a mechanism for processing and updating
information. I represent 𝑠 = 𝑔(𝜎) as the strategy that maps a signal realization
𝜎 into a guess about the state of the world, 𝑠. For example, given the fact that
the agent believes that the IPCC is a credible institution regarding climate
change (and thus, its information signals are accurate), 𝑔(𝑠|𝜎𝐼𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 0) = 0.
This is because the institution’s credibility, among other factors, will lead the
agent to guess that the state of the world is identical to the signal that she
receives. Credibility is defined as an idiosyncratic belief in the accuracy of the
source such that if a signal comes from that source, it causes an update in that
direction. Updating in the opposite direction may occur a low credibility rating
is assigned to the information source.
Given the damage function, I expand from the simple optimization
problem represented by equation (1) and incorporate the information updating
mechanism. Incorporating this intuition into the model, the generalized utility
function will look like:
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max 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑦) − 𝑑[𝑎|𝑔(𝜎)] s.t. 𝑃𝑎 ∙ 𝑎 + 𝑦 ≤ 𝑚
𝑎,𝑦

(3)

This utility function represents damages as a function of adaptation conditional
on the guessed state of the world, which in turn is a function of the information
signals received by the agent. This is different from equation (1) which
represents a static model that assumes the agent to have a fixed believed state.
Equation (3) represents a dynamic model in which she continues to guess and
update one’s believed state from the information signals received.
The basic intuition for the dynamic model is that when agents update
information, they are receiving additional information that affects their
assessment of the state of the world and environmental damages. This
assessment occurs every time the agent receives information she deems relevant.
However, not all additional signals necessarily translate into a new guessed state
of the world. While some signals may overturn prior beliefs, some may reinforce
them. In the next section, I lay out how this information updating would work.
3.3 Information Updating
With the given optimization problem in mind, I characterize the agent’s
processing of information signals as a two-stage choice. The first stage is
information selection in which the agent chooses to accept or reject the
consumption of information even before becoming aware of its content. This is
largely determined by her previous biases and personal characteristics, such as
age, political affiliation, area of residence, etc. This may or may not reinforce
her priors, but the absence of information stimuli will have no effect on her
perceived state of the world and adaptation decisions and thus the level of
environmental damages she will receives remains identical.
The second stage occurs when the agent decides to accept the information
presented. I assume that people update their beliefs in proportion to the degree
they believe the information received is true. Expanding from this assumption
and integrating the information processing model, I divide the world into two
potential scenarios, the main difference between the two being whether the
agent perceives the information presented as “objective” or “true.” oote the
final outcome as the amount of adaptation, and the individual’s perceived state
of the world as an intermediate outcome.
1) Presence of an objective source of information
In this scenario, the individual agent is an objective processor of
information. Again, I define objective information as one that brings individuals
to believe that climate change is exacerbating (s = 1). Accumulated
information signals that point at towards the true direction of climate change
will make the agent eventually believe that the level of climate change is high,
which is consistent with Bayesian updating. However, we will prove in the next
section that this is highly unlikely, since an agent’s priors not only affect her

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2020

11

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 17 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 10

initial behavior towards various information signals, but also on how she weighs
subsequent information signals.
a. s = 0 → s = 1 (enlightenment)
b. s = 1 → s = 1 (reinforcement of true beliefs)
2) Absence of an objective source of information
In this scenario, an individual believes that all information is opinionated;
she believes there is an agenda underlying the “objective” information.
Therefore, the convergence that was seen in the previous section is no longer
present and all four outcomes become possible.
a. s = 0 → s = 0 (reinforcement of false beliefs)
b. s = 0 → s = 1 (enlightenment)
c. s = 1 → s = 0 (erosion/misinformation of beliefs)
d. s = 1 → s = 1 (reinforcement of true beliefs)
3.4 Information and Weights
In the previous section, I assumed that an agent would update her beliefs
in proportion to the degree in which she believes the information she received
is true. In this section, I expand on this assumption by explaining the degree of
this shift in terms of the different weights the agent places on each information
source. In other words, I will attribute the different outcomes regarding the
agent’s believed state of the world and the degree to which she shifts her beliefs
to the fact that not all processed information is weighted equally. If two different
agents who possess the same set of priors (s = 0) and encounter the same
piece of information regarding climate change (𝜎 = 1) end up with different
beliefs, this can only be attributed to the fact that the two agents have assigned
different weights to the most recent information signal they have encountered.
The different weights agents assign to different information signals
ultimately dictate their beliefs and final adaptive behavior. To draw out this
mechanism, I write a weight vector 𝑤 and a sigma vector 𝜎 that lay out 𝑛
different weights assigned to 𝑛 pieces of information. I also write a vector 𝛼
that represents an individual’s idiosyncratic characteristics, such as political
affiliation or age group.
I assume that an agent’s guess about the state of the world 𝑔 is a weighted
sum of her priors and accumulated information up until that point in time. The
updating process is parallel to Bayesian updating in which one’s prior set of
probability distributions are altered after encountering an information signal.
Similar to Bayesian updating, the proposed model is continuous in that an agent
assigns a weight whenever she encounters new information, and if necessary,
reassigns weights to previous pieces of information with their weights serving
as a reference for their reassignment. Based on this hypothesis, the weighted
information updating mechanism looks as follows:
𝑔 = ℎ(𝛼) ∙ 𝑤0 + 𝑤(𝛼) ∙ 𝜎
(4)
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The first term represents the proportion an agent’s priors are taken into
account in her decision-making process. An agent’s priors, which I represent as
ℎ(𝛼), take on a fixed value based on the agent’s characteristics and are likely to
be fixed (i.e. such biases are “predetermined” in the sense that individuals with
certain characteristics are more likely than not to hold certain beliefs as true). I
denote people’s previous biases as some function of 𝛼 and assign a weight
vector 𝑤0 that represents how much an agent’s personal traits, and by
extension, her biases, are considered even when new information comes in.
The latter term, which represents the accumulation of an individual’s
processed information, can also be written as the sum of the product of the
weight vector and the sigma vector (𝑤𝑛 𝜎𝑛 ). The first few signals retained in an
agent’s memory at a given time are represented as 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 , and their
corresponding weights as 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 , all the way to 𝜎𝑛 and 𝑤𝑛 . Similar to
how I represented the agent’s priors, the weight vectors are represented in terms
of 𝛼 such that if two people have distinct values of 𝛼, then they would assign
different weights to it and come up with different guesses about the state of the
world even if they receive the same information. In other words, the way in
which people assign different weights to each piece of information is affected
by individual characteristics, which can be represented by 𝑤(𝛼). Therefore, 𝛼
contributes to both an agent’s priors and the way in which she weighs different
pieces of information as updating occurs.
Suppose that 𝛼 is a vector that represents political affiliation. While one’s
political preference may contribute to forming prior biases about climate change
in that one may hold beliefs consistent with party lines, it may also affect how
one assigns weights to incoming and past information. For example, Democrats
or younger people may not only be more concerned about climate change to
begin with, but also more receptive of new information, thus assigning higher
weights to such information signals as long as they are believed to be credible.
Given that 𝑔 can only take on the value of 0 or 1, we set up the weight
vector so that the sum of 𝑤0 and all other weight vectors 𝑤𝑛 equal 1. This
ensures that according to this set-up, while both the sigmas and the prior biases
are on the range of 0 to 1, 𝑔 will be as well. Though this would represent 𝑔
as a number between the continuous scale of 0 and 1 (as opposed to discrete
values), we interpret it as the guessed likelihood that one’s guessed state equals
1. Therefore, the individual is taking on probabilistic, rather than discrete, views
of the state of the world. This is more consistent with the idea that an individual
does not have a static, discrete view of the world, but a dynamic and continuous
one. Reflecting the change from a static to a dynamic updating process, we also
alter the damage function such that 𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑔(𝜎).
3.5 Theoretical Implications
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With the information updating model like equation (3) that takes into
account the process in which different pieces of information are weighted, I
hypothesize that when a new piece of information is processed, an agent can
acquire any of the four possible outcomes previously mentioned in section 3.3:
reinforcement of true beliefs, enlightenment, erosion of true beliefs, and
reinforcement of false beliefs. The kind of outcome and that which happens will
depend on what the agent’s priors are, how heavily the priors are weighted, and
how heavily the agent weighs a given information source (i.e. how credible she
believes it to be).
Given the utility function, an agent chooses an optimal value of 𝑎 (i.e. level
of adaptation) to maximize her utility. If an agent were exposed to correct
information and was an unbiased processor of that information, she should end
up at the best possible guess of adaptation regardless of her priors; if that
decision was made based on a sufficient amount of information, she should
arrive at her true optimal adaptation level. As the agent’s perceived state of the
world changes, her damage function will shift as well, which will cause the
agent to re-optimize her adaptation levels. In other words, an agent’s priors and
biases create a gap between 𝑎′, which represents the optimal level of adaptation
under the true state of the world, and 𝑎" , which represents the level of
adaptation an agent undertakes due to her perception of climate change.
Though not officially modeled, information selection is a source of bias
that may affect the agent’s objective processing of information. I assume that
most mainstream media and educational institutions lean towards 𝑠 = 1 such
that if an agent with a prior of 0.5 (i.e. completely unbiased towards either
direction) was continuously exposed to a random selection of sources with
uncorrelated sigmas, she would acquire the belief 𝑔(𝜎) = 1. I also assume that
people tend to consume a specific set of media that align with their priors and
acquired beliefs rather than a balanced bundle, which suggests selection bias.
Furthermore, such consumption habits would form relatively quickly after
the initial exposure to an information source, since all information that the agent
encounters would project signals that would continue to elicit subsequent
opinions and reactions within the agent. For example, an agent who initially
encounters a media source leaning towards 𝑠 = 1 may either be persuaded by
it or seek out information to the contrary after thinking its argument is “false”
or “overly pessimistic.” She would then seek out the next source that either
confirms or goes against her initial belief, be persuaded or dissuaded by it, and
continue this process until both her opinion towards climate change and her
information consumption habits are solidified. However, the fact that there is a
mutual interaction between the selection of information and opinion formation
makes it easier for the agent to quickly acquire a highly opinionated belief. If
the information signals an agent encounters over time point towards the same
direction (i.e. the agent forms segregated media habits), it would be unlikely
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that her beliefs will be corrected. Such behavior also affects the mechanisms
that interfere with the agent’s information processing.
I will now analyze how the three real-life factors laid out in section 2.4
make under-adaptation, rather than over-adaptation, the more likely outcome.
First, an agent who is too sticky with her priors will assign relatively small
weights to newly perceived information signals. Information selection affects
the process in which an agent forms her own opinions by determining the degree
in which the agent may be willing to accept new information. This makes the
overturning of beliefs in either direction unlikely since the agent is certain of
her priors to the extent that she is unwilling to listen to new evidence that may
contain updated or factually correct information. When the agent’s priors lean
towards 𝑔(𝜎) = 0, she will come out with greater certainty of her priors since
she will not have access to information relaying true signals about climate
change. This is likely the product of the agent’s sticky priors interacting with
her media consumption habits in that she will choose information that will
further confirm, rather than cast doubt on, her priors to continue being right.
Therefore, the agent is prone to under-adaptation. Though those with priors of
𝑔(𝜎) = 1 are more likely to engage in some level of adaptation, it is unclear
whether they may reach their optimal levels.
Second, optimism bias also decreases individual sensitivity to risk by
preventing agents from extrapolating factually correct information that apply to
the general population to themselves. Agents prone to optimism bias will
believe their own probability of being exposed to a certain risk is lower than the
stated factual number, despite being aware of the damage function and the
effects of adaptation on their expected damages. In the damage function 𝑑 =
(𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑔(𝜎), 𝛽0 represents an agent’s true damages since 𝑑 = 𝛽0 when
𝑎 = 0 and 𝑔(𝜎) = 1 . The value of 𝛽0 may differ based on a number of
factors (e.g. geography, average regional temperature), but optimism bias will
make the agent perceive a level of 𝛽0 smaller than its true value rather than
affecting 𝑔(𝜎). With this perception of 𝛽0, assuming the agent has an upper
limit to the level of damages she is willing to tolerate, she will choose a level of
𝑎 equivalent to when she would have believed 𝑔(𝜎) < 1, thus gravitating
towards under-adaptation.
Third, a lack of access to the most recent or accurate scientific information
implies that the agent may disproportionately receive noisy information such
that even if she were not behaviorally biased to begin with, she could end up
with the wrong beliefs. With the aforementioned assumption that perception
directly shapes behavior, the agent would gravitate towards under-adaptation.
Furthermore, without continued exposure to scientific information, agents may
lack the ability to critically process that information or assign the correct
weights to subsequent information signals they encounter. Lacking the ability
to process what is objectively true or important, agents may be tempted to “fall
back” on their priors instead of going through the mental process of sorting and
digesting information. Those without access to scientific information may
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continue to believe 𝑔(𝜎) = 1 and choose their optimal adaptation levels, but
the thought process is identical to the agent having sticky priors towards
𝑔(𝜎) = 1.
Furthermore, even if an agent has a prior leaning towards 𝑔(𝜎) = 1, it is
more likely than not that the average agent is unable to keep up with the full
scope of damages she will potentially become exposed to as climate change
accelerates and new damage pathways are becoming discovered.
Because I am assuming a dynamic model in which the agent perceives the
world in probabilistic terms, the agent’s perceived state of the world is important
for her adaptation decisions even if her perceptions are not precisely 𝑔(𝜎) = 1.
I will divide this into two basic scenarios, when the agent’s perceptions are
exactly 𝑔(𝜎) = 0 and when they are not.
First, I assume that the agent’s perceived state of the world is 𝑔(𝜎) = 0.
Given the damage function 𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑔(𝜎) , the level of perceived
damages is 𝑑 = 0 regardless of the value of 𝑎 the agent chooses. Therefore,
the agent is free to choose whatever value of adaptation she sees fit. However,
since adaptation is costly and requires consumption to be given up, if the agent
believes that 𝑑 = 0, adaptation provides no benefits. Therefore, assuming that
the agent is a rational economic agent, no adaptation will be done (𝑎 = 0).
On the contrary, the level of adaptation greatly depends on the agent’s
perceived state of the world if she believes that 𝑔(𝜎) > 0. If one agent believes
in a larger value of 𝑔(𝜎) than another (i.e. believes with a higher probability
that the state of climate change is very severe), it follows that the former would
have to choose a higher level of 𝑎 if she wants to receive the same amount of
perceived damages as the agent who is less cautious. While both agents would
believe that they are receiving the same amount of damages, the actual level of
damages would be very different since the former agent would undertake a
higher level of adaptation than the latter. Furthermore, if the true state of climate
change is more severe than that perceived by the agent who is more cautious,
both agents would fail to meet the ideal amount of adaptation that is required to
offset the damages they receive.
When the agent becomes influenced by any of the three factors mentioned
in the beginning of this section, reinforcement of false beliefs becomes the most
likely outcome. I conclude that information has the possibility, but is not very
likely, to overturn an agent’s priors that have been accumulated for a prolonged
period of time. Simply put, without the surrounding community’s reinforced
input or access to the most updated scientific information, it is difficult for the
average agent who has a prior leaning towards 𝑔(𝜎) = 1, or even a balanced
prior, to sustain a reversal in her beliefs due to behavioral heuristics. By
underestimating the state of climate change, the agent is likely to a level of
adaptation that is less than optimal, therefore receiving a higher level of actual
damages than she had originally expected.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I constructed a model of individual adaptation to climate

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol17/iss1/10

16

Sung: Information Perception and Climate Change Adaptation

change in the presence and absence of perceived climate change and examine
agents’ cognitive processes of information selection and perception. With agents
taking in information signals as inputs, the agent’s perception of the presence or
absence of objective individual would affect the agent’s involvement in a
rational Bayesian updating process. Those who do not believe in the presence
of objective information are more likely to engage in reinforcement of their
priors, and particularly reinforcement of false beliefs. With the assumption that
beliefs towards a certain behavior affect one’s intention of carrying out such
behavior, such agents were more likely to choose a level of adaptation lower
than their optimal level, thus widening the gap between their expected and
actual level of damages and utility.
Previous studies have focused on how individual perception of risk,
including that of climate change, affects adaptation behavior, cognitive
pathways relevant to risk perception, and motivation. However, this paper
contributes to the existing literature by generating a standard utility model that
takes into account the dynamic process of information updating and laying out
how the behavioral and environmental factors affect such cognitive processes.
As long as information about climate change is relayed from outside
sources and individual adaptation behavior is directly formed by such
communicative and cognitive processes, there will be an increasing need for
more effective communication regarding not only the risks of climate change,
but also targeted adaptation techniques. Kahan et al. (2012) suggested that
communicators should endeavor to create a deliberative climate in which
accepting the best available science does not threaten any group’s values, such
as using culturally diverse communicators or information-framing techniques
that invest policy solutions with messages congenial to diverse groups. The way
in which information about climate change and the state of the earth is
communicated and dissemination must be effective, nudging people to acquire
true beliefs before they reinforce their priors with both selective information
consumption and information updating. Further research could compare
communicative strategies in an experimental setting, examining the most
effective way to induce socially optimal behavior or increase the retention or
comprehension of information.
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